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Abstract
The Farm Input Subsidy Programme targets households 
for subsidized farm inputs, and usually it is the head of 
the household who receives the coupons. Since 
households tend to have multiple plots which are 
controlled by different members of the household, there 
may be intra-household issues that arise in the use of 
farm inputs available to the household. We find that while 
male-headed households are more likely to receive 
coupons than female-headed households, there seems 
to be less bias in intra-household use of subsidized 
fertilizers (or fertilizers in households receiving subsidy) 
between plots controlled by female and male members. 
This is despite the fact that, more generally, household 
incomes from various sources tend to be controlled and 
allocated by men. It also contrasts with evidence that 
plots controlled by female members were less likely to 
be applied with fertilizers when we consider all fertilizers 
in subsidized and unsubsidized households.
Keywords: Malawi; Agricultural Subsidies; Gender
1.  Introduction
Gender equality and women’s empowerment are 
increasingly recognised as an integral aspect of 
development alongside central policy objectives such 
as the achievement of Millennium Development Goals. 
There is a large and growing literature on resource 
allocation processes within households and the 
associated gender dimensions. Çağatay and Ertürk (2004) 
argue that social inequalities, including those based on 
gender differentiation, hamper the development process 
and dampen economic growth. According to Senguino 
(2000) the state of gender relations is readily observable 
in several economic arenas: a) job segregation within 
the paid labour market, b) the division of labour between 
paid and unpaid labour, c) the distribution and control 
of income and resources within the household, d) access 
to the distributions by the state, such as access to 
education and social safety net programmes, and e) credit 
in financial markets. The effect of gendered economic 
opportunities is such that the pattern of benefits is 
extremely skewed with men continually – either directly 
or indirectly – obtaining much of the credit, monopolising 
contacts with extension agents and more likely to have 
access to scarce production inputs such as fertilizer 
(Sender 2003).
Questions about gender issues and household 
resource allocation also arise in the Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (FISP) implemented by the Government of 
Malawi, that has been in place since the 2005/06 
agricultural seasons. FISP is designed as a targeted input 
subsidy programme, targeting smallholder farmers with 
land but who cannot afford to purchase inputs at market 
prices. The main objective of the programme is to raise 
the income of smallholder farmers through improvements 
in agricultural productivity and food security. The size of 
the FISP rose from 132,000 tonnes of subsidised fertiliser 
in 2005/06 to 216,000 tonnes in 2007/08 and has since 
fallen back to 160,000 tonnes in 2009/10 (Dorward and 
Chirwa 2010).
This paper attempts to investigate the gender 
differences in the application of fertilizers in general and 
subsidized fertilizers in particular, on plots controlled by 
male and female household members. We utilize 
quantitative and qualitative data collected in the 2009 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Survey (AISS2) covering the 
2008/09 agricultural season. We basically test two 
hypotheses. First, we test whether there are gender 
differences in the use of available fertilizers regardless 
of type of acquisition (hence, commercial and subsidized 
fertilizers) by plots controlled by female and male 
members of the households). Second, we test the same 
hypothesis except that we focus on households that had 
access to subsidized fertilizers only – those that did not 
acquire commercial fertilizers. The paper is organized 
into five sections. In the next section, we highlight the 
theoretical issues in household decision making in 
relation to the design of the subsidy programme. In 
section 3, we outline the methodology and sources of 
data. Section 4 presents results on gender differences in 
the application of fertilizers within households. Finally, 
in section 5 we present concluding remarks.
2.  Gender, Intra-household 
Decisions and Subsidies
The theoretical literature on household resource 
allocation revolves around two competing models of 
the household, namely unitary and collective models 
(Udry et al. 1995; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000; 
Bourguignon et al. 2009). The traditional view has been 
the unitary model of the household, in which household 
decisions are analysed as if they are made by a unique 
decision making unit to maximize some common welfare 
index. On the other hand, there are collective models, 
in which household decisions emerge from bargaining 
among members of the household, resulting in Pareto 
efficient outcomes. These models allow different 
preferences among household members but decisions 
are made to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes. Most of 
these studies implicitly assume that the farming 
household behaves as if it were an individual farmer, 
hence ignoring plot level characteristics and the intra-
household resource allocation of the household.
In the context of agricultural production in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Udry (1996) and Udry et al. (1995) recognize the 
complexity of household decision making in intra-
household resource allocation and test the Pareto 
efficiency hypothesis using plot level information and 
characteristics. Pareto efficiency in the Browning and 
Chiappori (1994) tradition implies that factors of 
production will be allocated efficiently across plots and 
that there will be no differences in the productivity of 
different plots with the same crops controlled by different 
individuals in the household. The empirical results 
obtained by Udry (1996) and Udry et al. (1995) using plot 
characteristics, show that plots controlled by women 
produced more inefficiently than plots controlled by men 
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within the same household for the same crops. However, 
Akresh (2005) using a collective bargaining model, find 
that households in Burkina Faso that were experiencing 
negative rainfall shocks were less likely to exhibit Pareto 
inefficiency in intra-household resource allocation. 
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) find that assets 
controlled by women have a positive and significant 
effect on expenditure allocations toward the next 
generation, such as education and children’s clothing. 
Grogan (2004) finds that households in Russia containing 
only female adults have significantly different resource 
allocation patterns than those containing adult males.
The FISP is targeted at households, with each targeted 
household expected to receive 2 coupons for subsidized 
fertilizers and one coupon for subsidized improved maize 
or/and legume seeds. In recent years the targeting 
guidelines have also encouraged communities to accord 
special consideration to vulnerable groups such as child-
headed, female-headed or orphan-headed households 
and those households affected by HIV and AIDS (GOM 
2008). However, in practice it has been found that 
although each household is expected to receive 2 
fertilizer coupons, some households receive less or more 
than the expected number (Dorward et al. 2010).
The targeting at household level assumes that the 
household is a unitary decision making unit in the use 
of fertilizers. However, in many rural communities in 
Malawi, households tend to have multiple plots used for 
cultivation of different crops and controlled by different 
members of the household, and allocation of inputs may 
depend on the bargaining strength of household 
members. It is not clear whether such biases are also 
evident within the household with respect to allocation 
and use of fertilizers among plots controlled by different 
members of the households. Previous studies that have 
looked at access to subsidized fertilizers in Malawi find 
that female-headed households are less likely to receive 
coupons than male-headed households (Chirwa et al. 
2011) and where female-headed households receive 
subsidy coupons they also tend to receive less compared 
to their male counterparts (SOAS et al. 2008; Dorward et 
al. 2010). In addition, male-headed recipient households 
tend to receive more maize fertilizer coupons than 
female-headed recipient households, with male-headed 
households receiving on average 1.55 coupons compared 
to 1.45 coupons received by female-headed households 
in 2008/09 (with 1.7 compared to 1.3 coupons received 
per households in 2006/07). With respect to communities’ 
perceptions on who is likely to receive coupons, there 
were no significant differences between male-headed 
and female-headed households across regions (Dorward 
et al. 2010). In addition, in 2008/09 season 81 percent of 
male-headed households and 66 percent of female-
headed households reported utilizing savings to obtain 
cash for coupon redemption, but a higher percentage 
of female-headed households relied on gifts (11 percent) 
compared with male-headed households (2 percent).
The findings on access to subsidized fertilizers from 
previous studies mask issues of who actually uses the 
fertilizers available to the household. Most of the coupons 
within the household were received by the household 
head. The data reveals that only 2.7 percent of households 
that received coupons in the 2008/09 had more than 1 
member receiving coupons and 4.1 percent of households 
that received coupons had one person receiving more 
than two coupons. Given that most of the coupons were 
received by one member of the household and the 
possibility of pooling in households receiving more than 
one coupon, intra-household issues become important 
in determining the extent to which subsidized fertilizers 
reach and benefit female members of households.
3. Methodology and Data
In order to investigate gender issues in the use of 
coupons and utilization of subsidized inputs, we use both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the 
quantitative approach, we investigate intra-household 
resource use through descriptive analysis and 
econometric analysis. The discussion of the quantitative 
analysis will be enriched or triangulated by qualitative 
data generated from focus group discussions in different 
communities. In the descriptive analysis, we review the 
differences in access to coupons by gender of household 
head, application of commercial and/or subsidized 
fertilizers and intensity of use of fertilizers by male and 
female household members.
Our econometric approach will be based on probit 
regression analysis in which we estimate the probability 
of applying fertilizers on a plot. We estimate the following 
model:
where FPij is a dummy variable indicating whether 
fertilizer was applied on plot i controlled by member j 
in the household, FEMij is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if member j controlling plot i is female, and Xk is a vector 
of household level characteristics and εi is the random 
error term. We estimate the model in equation (1) under 
three scenarios: (a) intra-household use assuming 
availability of fertilizers at the household regardless 
source of fertilizers, (b) intra-household use assuming 
availability of fertilizers in subsidized households, and 
(c) intra-household use assuming that only subsidized 
fertilizers were available to the household. We use gender 
of the household member who controls input and 
farming decisions on the plot as the main variable of 
interest and control for farmer characteristics and other 
household characteristics such as plot size, age of 
household head, headship of household, cultivation of 
tobacco, sale of maize, access to safely nets, previous 
access to subsidized fertilizers and district dummies. Our 
dependent variable is the likelihood of applying fertilizer 
on a plot and is defined as a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the plot controlled by a household member 
had fertilizer applied in 2008/9 season, otherwise equal 
to zero. In the household questionnaire, for each plot 
households were asked to indicate whether fertilizer was 
applied on the plot or not.
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The main independent variable of interest is the 
gender of the farmer. Doss and Morris (2001) notes that 
most conventional technology adoption studies define 
the gender of the farmer as gender of household head, 
but this masks the intra-household variations in adoption 
for female farmers in male-headed households1. Chirwa 
(2005) uses both the gender of the member who makes 
most farming decisions on the plot and the gender of 
household head in the study of adoption of hybrid maize 
seeds and fertilizers. In this study we use gender of the 
member who makes most farming decisions on the plot. 
The gender of who controls the plot is defined as a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the plot is controlled by a 
female member of the household. If resource allocation 
(fertilizer application) is efficient, we expect to accept 
the null hypothesis that there are no differences in 
allocation of fertilizers to male and female controlled 
plots. In order to further investigate the impact of 
household characteristics on the gender of the farmer, 
we also include three interaction variables of household 
characteristics and the gender of the member who 
controls the plot: female-controlled plots and coupon 
recipient household, female-controlled plots and male-
headed household and female controlled plots and 
household with commercial fertilizers.
Other variables in the model include plot size, male-
headship of household, age of household head, 
household size, household land size holding, cultivation 
of tobacco, commercialisation of maize, household 
poverty self-assessment in 2007, use of commercial 
fertilizer in previous season (2007/08), access to subsidy 
in previous season, access to safety nets in previous 
season and district dummies. Plot size and household 
land holdings are measured in hectares. Male-headed 
household is represented by a dummy equal to one if 
the member controlling the plot comes from a male-
headed household. Based on gender discrimination, we 
expect female-controlled plots in male-headed 
households to be disadvantaged with respect to 
application of fertilizers. Cultivation of tobacco and sale 
of maize capture the commercialisation agriculture for 
individual households and enter the models as dummy 
variables. We expect commercialisation to offer more 
incentives for application of fertilizers on different plots 
in order to maximize farm revenues. We capture the 
resource endowment of households by including the 
number of adult equivalents (family labour resource) and 
household’s own assessment of poverty in 2007 to 
capture wealth. We hypothesise that households with 
available family labour and non-poor households are 
more likely to apply fertilizer on their plots. Availability 
of family labour facilitates better management of 
fertilized plots whose productivity largely depends on 
timely management such as weeding and application 
of fertilizers, both of which require labour among 
smallholder farmers.
Owing to the district-specific variability in access to 
fertilizers, we also include district dummy variables in 
the model. There are 14 districts in our sample, with 
Chitipa district as our base category. The districts include 
Chitipa, Karonga and Mzimba in the northern region; 
Kasungu, Nkhotakota, Lilongwe, Dedza and Ntcheu in 
the central region; and Mangochi, Zomba, Blantyre, 
Thyolo, Phalombe and Chikwawa in the southern 
region.
We utilize quantitative and qualitative data collected 
in the AISS 2009 covering 2008/09 agricultural season2. 
Household data come from a sample of 1,982 rural 
households drawn from 14 districts. Focus group 
discussions (FGDs) were conducted in 8 of the 14 districts 
covered by the household survey and in each district 
discussions were held with two groups (male and 
female)3.  While the allocation and distribution of coupons 
is at household level, in order to investigate intra-
household use of subsidized fertilizers, data on application 
of fertilizers is at plot level and each plot was identified 
with a household member who was mostly responsible 
for crop and input decision on the plot. The sample of 
households gives us 4,727 plot level observations. In 
focus group discussions, intra-household allocations 
were discussed within the context of overall resource 
allocation rather than relating to use of subsidized 
fertilizer in particular
4.  Results and Discussion
4.1  Descriptive Analysis and Qualitative 
Evidence
Plot level analysis enables us to compare input use 
between female-controlled and male-controlled plots 
within the household. Out of 4,727 plots, 71 percent and 
29 percent are male-controlled and female-controlled 
within the household, respectively. Table 1 presents the 
gender differences in member and household 
characteristics by gender of the member who makes 
input decisions on the plots, regardless of source of 
fertilizers. We find significant differences in the 
characteristics of the member and their household of 
origin across the variables, with the exception of sale of 
maize by the household. Male members of households 
are younger than female members, with an average 
difference of about 4 years. Almost all male members 
(99%) who control plots come from male-headed 
households while only 28 percent of female members 
who control plots come from male-headed households. 
This may suggest that females in male-headed households 
tend to have little control over farming decisions. Male 
members who control plots tend to originate from larger 
households and households with more land than female 
members who control plots. It is worth noting that in 
male-headed households only 10.4 percent of the plots 
are female-controlled (mainly spouses) while in female-
headed households only 5 percent (3.1 percent being 
spouses) of the plots are male-controlled.
There are also significant differences in terms of 
households’ participation in the cultivation of tobacco 
in the 2008/09 agricultural season. About 28 percent of 
male members controlling plots come from households 
that grew tobacco compared to only 15 percent of female 
members. The differences are statistically significant at 
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the 1 percent level. However, there are no significant 
differences between households with male and female 
members controlling plots as regards households’ sale 
of maize in the 2008/09 season4. Tobacco is the main 
cash crop grown by smallholder farmers in Malawi while 
maize is the main staple crop. The difference in the gender 
of control of crops within the households suggests that 
tobacco is mainly a men’s crop while maize is gender 
neutral. Since tobacco is a cash income earning crop, 
due to gender biases in the control of cash incomes in 
Malawi society, men tend to control cash cropping 
activities within the household. There is, however, greater 
access to social safety nets among female members (16 
percent) controlling plots than among male members 
(13 percent) controlling the plots and this difference is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 2 presents gender differences in plot size and 
access to and use of fertilizers among household 
members. Generally, plots controlled by men tend to be 
larger than those controlled by female members, with a 
difference of 0.06 hectares which is statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. However, there are no statistically 
significant differences across male and female controlled 
plots as regards the frequency or intensity of overall 
fertiliser application. In terms of household access to 
subsidized fertilizers, the proportion of household 
members from households with access to subsidised 
fertilizers increased from 65 percent in 2007/08 to 75 
percent in 2008/09. The lack of dominance of male 
members on use of subsidised fertilizers was also 
confirmed by focus group discussions in several districts. 
Most focus group discussions with females (such as in 
Zomba, Phalombe, Mzimba and Kasungu) revealed that 
decisions on the use of coupons and acquired fertilizers 
are collectively made by the family.
However, in some focus group discussions (such as in 
Chikwawa, Lilongwe and Karonga) it was reported that 
the use of coupons was mainly decided by men. In 
Ntcheu, the female group discussion argued that in a 
matrilineal system women should be in control of 
coupons. Women also argued in all the districts that if 
coupons were given to female members of the 
households, they were unlikely to sell the coupons. In 
most focus group discussions with men, it was noted 
that the families were involved in the decisions about 
use of coupons, although in a few districts, such as Zomba 
and Mzimba, men revealed that they were making most 
decisions about the use of coupons.
As regards access to commercial fertiliser, we also only 
find statistically significant differences between male and 
female members managing plots in 2008/09 at the 10 
percent level but no differences in 2007/08 season. In 
contrast, there are significant differences in access to 
commercial fertilizers in both seasons between the 
gender of the controller of plots, with the proportion 
with access to commercial fertilizers in 2007/8 almost 
doubling among both male and female members of 
households. In focus group discussions, we also discussed 
how incomes generated from different sources were 
controlled within the household. Table 3 presents a 
summary of the views from male and female groups in 
various districts. There are a lot of variations in the 
decision making processes about control and use of 
incomes within the household. The dominant view, 
however, is that men, particularly husbands, tend to be 
Table 1 Mean Member and Household Characteristics by Gender of Members Controlling Plots
Variable All Males 
controlling 
plots
Females 
controlling 
plots
Mean 
Difference
Age of Household Member
Male-headed Households (0/1)
Household Size (adult equivalent)
Household Land Size (hectares)
Household grew Tobacco 08/09 (0/1)
Household sold Maize 08/09 (0/1)
Household access Social Safety Net 07/08 (0/1)
45.98
0.782
4.956
1.224
0.239
0.103
0.146
44.74
0.985
5.122
1.314
0.275
0.102
0.139
49.04
0.281
4.545
1.001
0.150
0.106
0.163
-4.305a
0.703a
0.577a
0.313a
0.125a
-0.004
-0.024b
Note: (0/1) indicates dummy variable. Superscripts a, b and c indicate statistically significant differences at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 2 Mean Differences in Farming Characteristics by Gender of Members Controlling Plots
Variable All Male 
controlled
Female 
controlled
Mean 
Difference
Plot size (Hectare)
Application of Fertilizers (0/1)
Fertilizer Intensity (Kg/Hectare)
Households Subsidized 08/09 (0/1)
Households Subsidized 07/08 (0/1)
Household with commercial fertilizer 08/09 (0/1)
Household with commercial fertilizer 07/08 (0/1)
0.382
0.653
107.0
0.750
0.652
0.473
0.342
0.399
0.649
107.5
0.757
0.653
0.502
0.376
0.340
0.662
105.8
0.732
0.651
0.401
0.258
0.059a
-0.014
1.677
0.025c
0.002
0.101a
0.118a
Note: (0/1) indicates dummy variable. Superscripts a, b and c indicate statistically significant differences at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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the main decision makers within the household. Both 
male and female focus group discussions perceived that 
men mostly dominate in deciding the allocation of 
incomes from produce sales, across the income sources. 
There are also a few instances in which decisions about 
resources were said to be jointly made by the husband 
and wife. Another interesting observation made was that 
it is usually in poor households that household resource 
allocation is dominated by men: in ‘not poor’ households, 
discussions normally precede joint decisions about 
resource use.
There was a dominant view from focus group 
discussions with women that individual members tend 
to control their own resources from remittances and 
ganyu labour, but this was less prevalent among the focus 
group discussions with men. In many women’s groups 
it was argued that the persons who receive the remittances 
are the ones who control this income and decide on its 
allocation, sometimes with consultations with family 
members. It was also observed that in many cases, it is 
women who receive remittances in the household, and 
they tend to control such income. Men’s focus group 
discussions revealed that for ganyu and remittance 
incomes, although men were in control, in many cases 
the decisions on the use are made by the family. In some 
women’s groups, income from business enterprises was 
typically controlled by owners of the business.
There was a general perception among women’s groups 
that when men control resources, they tend to use it for 
selfish purposes such as beer, at the expense of the 
welfare of the household. This view was reinforced by 
comments from some of the focus group discussions 
with men. For instance:
“Husband and wife sit down to discuss 
income allocation. Husband takes some to 
be spent on what he wants personally while 
the wife spends all of it on household needs.” 
[FGD with Men in Mzimba District]
It appears that resource allocation within the household 
is embedded in the culture in which for households that 
are male-headed, the husband seems to have control 
over more resource allocations. However, the analysis 
shows that intra-household issues are complex and the 
extent to which males dominate over control and 
allocation of resources varies from one transaction to 
another and from one district to another. There are also 
cases in which sources of income are personalized and 
household members earning such incomes tend to have 
control over such resources, as well as increasing evidence 
of collective decisions within the households for particular 
types of incomes such as produce sales and incomes 
from safety nets.
4.2 Econometric Evidence
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the regression models. The data show that a large 
proportion of plots were fertilized in 2008/09 agricultural 
season, accounting for about 65 percent of the plots. On 
about 29 percent of the plots women were the main 
decision makers in terms of input use and timing of crop 
activities on the plot. About 22 percent of female 
controlled plots belong to households that received 
subsidized fertilizer coupons but only 8 percent of female 
controlled plots belong to male-headed households and 
12 percent belong to households that had acquired 
commercial fertilizers.
Table 3 Reported Intra-Household Resource Allocation Decisions from FGDs
Source of Income Decision Makers Number of Male FGDs Number of Female 
FGDs
Business income
Incomes from produce sales
Incomes from public works 
programmes
Income from Ganyu
Remittances
Men 
Joint
Individual
Men 
Joint
Men 
Joint
Individual 
Men 
Joint
Men 
Women
Joint
Individual 
4
2
0
4
2
3
2
1
4
2
3
0
2
1
5
1
2
6
2
4
2
1
5
3
3
1
0
4
Note: Two focus group discussions (1 male and 1 female) were conducted in each of the 8 survey districts.
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On average, the sizes of the plots were 0.38 hectares, 
and were as small as 0.1 hectare and as large as 2.4 
hectares5. About 78 percent of the plots belong to male-
headed households and the average age of household 
heads is 47 years. The average size of households in terms 
of adult equivalents is about 5 adult members. In terms 
of commercialisation of households about 22 percent 
of plots belong to households that cultivated tobacco 
in the 2008/09 season and only 10 percent belong to 
households that participated in the sale of maize that 
they cultivated in 2008/09. We also note that 33 percent 
of the plots belong to households that acquired 
commercial fertilizers in 2007/08 season households. 
Using a subjective self-assessment of poverty, the data 
show that most of the plots (86 percent) are owned by 
households that assessed themselves as poor. Access to 
other safety net programmes is not as common, but most 
of the households also acquired subsidized fertilizers in 
2007/08, indicating high incidence of repeated access 
to subsidized fertilizers.
We now turn to our estimated regression models of 
correlates of the likelihood of application of fertilizer on 
plots held by household members. We use gender of the 
member who controls input and farming decisions on 
the plot as the variable describing decision making on 
fertiliser use, and control for farmer characteristics and 
other household characteristics. Thus, we examine the 
combined effects on plot fertiliser use of gender of the 
member, plot size, age of household head, headship of 
household, cultivation of tobacco, sale of maize, access 
to safely nets, access and previous access to subsidized 
fertilizers, and district dummies. Table 5 reports regression 
results for three models that were estimated: (1) intra-
household use assuming availability of commercial and/
or subsidised fertilizers at the household regardless of 
source of fertilizers – Model 1, (2) intra-household use 
assuming availability of commercial and/or subsidised 
fertilizers only in households receiving some subsidised 
fertiliser – Model 2, and (3) intra-household use assuming 
that only subsidized fertilizers were available to the 
household (i.e. excluding households who also obtained 
commercial fertilisers) – Model 3. The models include 
five gender variables: female-controlled plots, male-
headed household, and interaction variables of female-
controlled plots with coupon recipient household, 
male-headed household and household with commercial 
fertilizers. In all the three models, the F-statistics suggest 
rejection of the null hypothesis that all parameter 
estimates are equal to zero.
We find that significant gender differentials exist in 
the allocation of fertilizers to plots within the households, 
with female-controlled plots less likely to have fertilizer 
applications compared to male-controlled plots. This is 
only in the case where we pool the sample of subsidized 
and unsubsidized households in Model 1. The probability 
of applying fertilizer falls by 0.28 points for female-
controlled plots, and the marginal effect is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. These results are similar 
to the findings in other studies in African agriculture such 
as Doss and Morris (2002) and Chirwa (2005), although 
in both those studies the coefficients of female were 
statistically insignificant. Model 1 results also show that 
female-controlled plots in coupon-recipient households 
were more likely to be fertilized as compared male-
controlled plots and female-controlled plots in female-
headed households. Access to subsidized fertilizers 
improves the odds for female-controlled plots, with the 
probability of fertilizer application increasing by 35 
percent compared to female-controlled plots in male-
headed and non-coupon recipient households. This 
implies that for a female household member in a coupon 
recipient household the mean increase in the probability 
of applying fertilizer on the plot is 0.07 points compared 
to a decrease of 0.28 points for a female member in a 
household without subsidized fertilizers.
Female-controlled plots in male-headed households 
were less likely to be fertilized than male-controlled plots 
as well as female-controlled plots in female-headed 
households, confirming the earlier observations in focus 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Application of fertilizer on the plot (0/1)*
Female household member (0/1)*
Female member in coupon recipient household (0/1)*
Female member in male-headed household (0/1)*
Female in household with commercial fertilizer (0/1)*
Plot size in hectares
Male-headed households (0/1)*
Age of household head
Number of adult equivalents
Log of household land size in hectares
Household that grew tobacco (0/1)
Household that sold maize (0/1)*
Household had commercial fertilizers in 2007 (0/1)*
Household own assessment as poor in 2007 (0/1)*
Household had access to safety nets 2007 (0/1)*
Household had access to subsidized fertilizers 2007 (0/1)*
0.6526
0.2932
0.2192
0.0829
0.1168
0.3832
0.7798
47.138
4.9455
0.0005
0.2293
0.1015
0.3345
0.8570
0.1441
0.6522
0.476
0.455
0.414
0.276
0.321
0.291
0.414
15.45
2.113
0.635
0.420
0.302
0.472
0.350
0.351
0.476
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.100
0.000
19.000
1.000
-2.291
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
2.400
1.000
95.000
16.980
1.929
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
Note: * (0/1) indicates dummy variable.
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group discussions that typically in male-headed 
households, resources are likely to be controlled by 
husbands. However, this is only the case when commercial 
fertilizers are also available to the household (models 1 
and 2) but it is not the case when households have access 
to subsidized fertilizers only. The results show that being 
a female member controlling a plot in a male-headed 
household reduces the probability of applying fertilizers 
by 28 percent in the model of subsidized and unsubsidized 
households (Model 1), but this bias reduces to 15 percent 
in subsidized households (Model 2). Hence, the bias 
against female-controlled plots in male-headed 
households is reduced as compared with the case when 
commercial fertilizer is also available at the household 
level. In Model 1, the results imply that the mean decrease 
in the probability of a female-controlled plot being 
fertilized in a coupon-recipient and male-headed 
household is 0.21 points. In Model 2, the decrease in the 
mean probability of applying fertilizer on female-
controlled plots in male-headed households is only 0.08 
compared to a decrease of 0.57 points for the same 
situation in Model 1.
In Models 1 and 2, we find that access to commercial 
fertilizers in 2008/09 season also favours women-
controlled plots in the application of fertilizers and raises 
the probability of application of fertilizers on the plot by 
21 percent in model 1 compared to male-controlled plots 
as well as female-controlled plots in households without 
commercial fertilizers. This is lower than the increase in 
the probability of 35 percent with households that 
received subsidised fertiliser. Among subsidized 
households (Model 2), the coefficient of female member 
in households with commercial fertilizer is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. The results show that 
the availability of commercial fertilizer in the household 
favours female-controlled plots, and increases the 
probability of fertilizer application by 7 percent. Overall, 
comparing Models 1 and 2, the mean decrease in the 
probabilities of applying fertilizers on a female-controlled 
plot in a male-headed household and a household with 
commercial fertilizers are 0.35 points and 0.007 points, 
respectively. This suggests that the bias against female 
farmers within households increases when only 
commercial fertilizers are available to the household. One 
likely explanation for low bias or lack of bias in fertilizer 
allocation in subsidized households is that most of the 
subsidy fertilizer is used for production of maize, which 
is mainly produced to meet subsistence needs for most 
households; and women tend to have higher bargaining 
strength over the provision of food in the household.
Male headship of households is positively related to 
the probability of applying fertilizer on the plot, but the 
coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level in Model 1. Male headship raises the probability of 
applying fertilizer on a plot by 0.12 points. The fact that 
male headship is only significant only in the model that 
includes households that were not subsidized confirms 
the lack of gender bias when households have access to 
subsidized fertilizers.
Table 5 Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates of Intra-Household Fertilizer Use
Dependent Variable: Plot controlled by member in 
household was fertilized (0/1)
Model 1
All 
Households
Model 2
(subsidy and/
or commercial)
Model 3
(subsidy only)
dF/dx t-ratio dF/dx t-ratio dF/dx t-ratio
Female household member *
Female member in coupon recipient household *
Female member in male-headed household *
Female in household with commercial fertilizer *
Plot size in hectares
Male-headed households *
Age of household head
Number of adult equivalents
Log of household land size in hectares
Household that grew tobacco *
Household that sold maize *
Household had commercial fertilizers in 2007 *
Household own assessment as poor in 2007 *
Household had access to safety nets 2007 *
Household had access to subsidized fertilizers 2007 *
District fixed effects?
-0.2844
0.3502
-0.2848
0.2154
0.4308
0.1223
-0.0008
-0.0043
-0.2389
0.1368
0.1255
0.1510
-0.0630
0.0109
0.1698
Yes
-3.50a
13.09a
-3.32a
7.30a
12.59a
1.65c
-1.45
-1.12
-15.05a
6.88a
4.90a
8.59a
-2.99a
0.49
9.44a
0.0780
-
-0.1581
0.0729
0.4664
0.0535
-0.0003
-0.0085
-0.1672
0.1067
0.0817
0.0776
-0.0447
0.0017
0.0570
Yes
1.30
-
-2.03b
2.66a
11.99a
0.84
-0.64
-2.37b
-13.34a
6.19a
3.59a
4.58a
-2.29b
0.08
3.05a
0.0401
-
-0.0730
-
0.4502
0.0120
0.0000
-0.0086
-0.2527
0.0755
0.0937
0.0101
0.0069
0.0276
0.0389
Yes
0.42
-
-0.65
-
8.42a
0.12
-0.07
-1.66c
-11.52a
2.51b
2.82a
0.31
0.22
0.96
1.43
Number of observations
Wald chi2(25)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R-squared
4727
1071.1
0.000
0.2281
3551.0
593.7
0.000
0.1826
1944
392.0
0.000
0.2003
Notes: (*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Superscripts a, b and c denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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The results also suggest that larger plots are more 
likely to be fertilized than smaller plots, and the marginal 
effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in 
all three models. However, plots that belong to households 
with larger land holding tend to be less fertilized. The 
coefficients of the household land holding size is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all 
three models. This may be due to the fact that most rural 
households are too cash constrained to afford fertilizers 
and tend to be very selective on plots that they apply 
fertilizers.
Commercialisation of agricultural activities using 
indicators such as cultivation of tobacco and sale of maize 
and acquisition of commercial fertilizer in the previous 
season by households is positively related to the 
probability of applying fertilizers on the plots. The 
coefficient of cultivation of tobacco is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in Models 1 
and 2 and at the 5 percent level in Model 3. Tobacco 
cultivation improves the probability of fertilizer 
application on the plot by 8–14 percent. Similarly, the 
coefficient sale of maize is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level in all three models and the coefficients 
suggest that maize sales raise the probability of plot 
being fertilized by 9–13 percent. The results suggest that 
commercialisation enables households to invest in 
fertilizers across the plots.
Self-reported poverty in the 2007/08 season may be 
one of the constraints to the 2008/09 application of 
fertilizers by households, with plots that belong to poor 
households less likely to be fertilized regardless of 
availability of commercial or subsidized fertilizers. The 
marginal effects of self-reported poverty are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in Model 
1 and 5 percent level in Model 2, and shows that the 
probability of applying fertilizer on plots falls by 6 percent 
and 4 percent among plots that belong to poor 
households, respectively. However, in households with 
only subsidized fertilizers being poor does not matter.
Households’ access to subsidized fertilizers in the 
previous season increases the probability of the plot 
being fertilized, demonstrating the positive cumulative 
effects of fertilizer adoption or continued access to 
subsidized fertilizers. However, this relationship is only 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in models 
where commercial fertilizers are also available among 
households but not significant among purely subsidized 
households. The probability of applying fertilizer to a 
plot with access to subsidy in previous season increases 
by 0.17 points and 0.06 points in Models 1 and 2, 
respectively.
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that in a socio-cultural 
environment in which men tend to dominate the decision 
making process within the household over allocation of 
income and resources, intra-household issues in the use 
of subsidized fertilizers are important in understanding 
the effectiveness of input subsidies and how they create 
more equal opportunities for female and male members 
of the household. Generally, men tend to control incomes 
from different sources even when such incomes are 
earned by female members, but there are a lot of 
exceptions and variations depending on the source of 
income and the poverty status of households. Using male 
and female control of plots, the study tests the efficient 
resource allocation hypothesis for the use of fertilizers 
among male and female controlled plots within the 
household.
Important differences exist in the characteristics of 
farmers and control of resources within households 
between male and female farmers. Male farmers tend 
to originate from households whose heads are younger, 
male and have larger household size compared to female 
farmers. Female farmers on average belong to households 
with smaller land parcels, households that grew less 
tobacco and households with higher access to social 
safety nets than their male counterparts. However, 
cultivation of maize tends to be gender neutral, with no 
significant differences between male and female farmers. 
Female farmers have on average smaller plots than male 
farmers and female farmers belong to households with 
less access to commercial fertilizers. These differences 
suggest that female farmers are disadvantaged in many 
respects in terms of access to resources, which may 
adversely affect their farming activities.
There are also diverse views on the allocation of 
different types of incomes within the households. The 
dominant view from both male and female groups is 
that men tend to control the allocation of incomes from 
business enterprises, crop sales, public works programmes 
and casual labour (ganyu) and remittances (particularly 
from men’s focus group discussions) while individual 
members earning such incomes dominate with respect 
to remittances (particularly among female focus group 
discussions). The dominant position in the decision 
making of incomes within households in Malawian 
society has implications on the allocation of social 
transfers or subsidies at household level.
The study finds that there are gender differences in 
the incidence of application of fertilizers, to the 
disadvantage of female-controlled plots when 
households have access to fertilizers regardless of source 
of fertilizers. This occurs first because female-headed 
households are less likely to use fertiliser than male-
headed households, and second because female-
controlled plots are less likely to use fertiliser than 
male-controlled plots in male-headed households. 
However, such gender differentials are less evident 
among subsidized households, except when subsidized 
households also have access to commercial fertilizers. 
Female-controlled plots in male-headed households are 
also less likely to benefit from available fertilizer among 
subsidized households. If we only consider the sub-sample 
of purely subsidized households, there is no difference 
in the application of fertilizers by gender of farmer who 
controls the plot. This implies that there is efficient 
allocation of subsidized fertilizers in such households. 
The bias in application of fertilizers arises when we pool 
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purely subsidized households, partially subsidized and 
non-subsidized households. Nonetheless, the availability 
of commercial fertilizers at the household level also 
increases the chances of applying fertilizer on female-
controlled plots, although female-controlled plots in the 
pooled sample remain disadvantaged.
Although female-headed households are less likely 
to receive coupons, potentially joint decision making 
prevails when it comes to use of subsidized fertilizers 
within the household, hence reducing the bias against 
female-controlled plots. This may be due to the fact that 
most of the subsidized fertilizer is meant for the cultivation 
of maize for subsistence needs, in which case women 
may have stronger countervailing power as providers of 
basic food needs at the household level. It is therefore 
important that analysis of gender issues in the subsidy 
programme goes beyond examination of differential 
access of subsidized fertilizers among male-headed and 
female-headed households, and also includes 
examination of intra-household use of subsidized 
fertilizers. The study implies that social transfers that focus 
on provision of basic services, such as input subsidy for 
household food security, are likely to be efficiently used 
even if they are targeted at household level instead of 
at individual household members.
End Notes
* This paper is an extended version of a policy paper in the 
Evaluation of the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
funded by the Department for International Development 
(DFID), Malawi. We acknowledge the financial support 
provided by DFID. The views expressed in this paper are those 
of the authors and the usual disclaimer applies.
† Corresponding author: Professor of Economics, Wadonda 
Consult, P.O. Box 669, Zomba, Malawi. Email: echirwa@yahoo.
com; a Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Social Research, 
Zomba, Malawi; b Professor of Development Economics, 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; 
and c Programme Analyst, UNDP, Lilongwe, Malawi.
1 Doss (2002) in a study of cropping patterns in Ghana uses 
three definitions of the gender of farmers: (a) the gender of 
the individual who holds land in the household, (b) the gender 
of the household head, and (c) gender of the member in the 
household who controls revenues from farming activities on 
the plot.
2 See Dorward (2010) for a description of data and the coverage 
of the household survey and focus group discussions.
3 Focus Group Discussions were conducted in the following 
districts: Karonga and Mzimba in the northern region; 
Kasungu, Lilongwe, and Ntcheu in the central region; and 
Zomba, Phalombe and Chikwawa in the southern region.
4 The sale of maize does not account for the fact that some of 
these households also are net maize buyers. In this case, the 
sale of maize is used here as one of the indicators of 
commercialisation of agriculture.
5 This is the case because we eliminated outlier plot sizes that 
were less than 0.1 hectare and those that were more than 2.5 
hectares.
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